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tees, surrender options and bonus provisions. A case in point are the with-proﬁts insurance
policies oﬀered by UK insurers. While these policies have been oﬀered in some form for cen-
turies, in recent years their structure and management have become substantially more
involved. The products are particularly complicated due to the wide discretion they aﬀord
insurers in determining the bonuses policyholders receive. In this paper, we study the problem
of an insurance ﬁrm attempting to structure the portfolio underlying its with-proﬁts fund. The
resulting optimization problem, a non-linear program with stochastic variables, is presented in
detail. Numerical results show how the model can be used to analyze the alternatives available
to the insurer, such as diﬀerent bonus policies and reserving methods.
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In recent times there has been a dramatic move of households assets towards
higher return investment vehicles. By far the vast majority of these assets have en-
tered the mutual fund market. Insurance companies have attempted to compete
for a portion of households funds by introducing innovative policies oﬀering various
bonus provisions, minimum rates of guarantee and surrender options. This paper
analyzes the problem of optimally structuring the portfolio of an insurer that oﬀers
accumulating ‘‘with-proﬁts’’ policies with minimum guarantees, similar to those of-
fered in the UK. These products oﬀer policyholders both a minimum guaranteed rate
of return, and the ability to participate in the returns of a portfolio with a high equity
content. The insurer also provides a smoothing of these returns to the policyholders,
so that they do not experience the full volatility of the underlying portfolio. In this
paper, we present the insurers portfolio selection problem as a non-linear mathemat-
ical program with stochastic variables, which is analyzed to highlight the diﬀerent
features of the policies.
1.1. The insurance products
Insurance products in which investors participate in the proﬁts of the company,
referred to as ‘‘with-proﬁts’’ policies, have been oﬀered in the UK since the 18th cen-
tury. The modern products have become signiﬁcantly more complicated than the
originals, oﬀering numerous guarantees and surrender options. The policies have
also recently come under a great deal of scrutiny due to the wide discretion they af-
ford the ﬁrm in terms of structuring the bonuses received by policyholders. Ironi-
cally, the ﬁrst company to oﬀer with-proﬁts policies, Equitable Life (the worlds
oldest mutually owned assurance company), had to close its fund to new business
after suﬀering substantial losses and losing a high proﬁle decision by the House of
Lords (Equitable v Hyman). The case arose when Equitable attempted to exercise
the discretion that it believed it had under the policies.
A useful description of the nature and types of with-proﬁts business in the UK is
provided by the Financial Services Authority (2001). In particular, the following key
features of with-proﬁts policies are identiﬁed:
• Premiums are pooled and invested in a portfolio with signiﬁcant proportions in
equity and property (high return, but high risk investments).
• The insurance company provides some ‘‘smoothing’’ of the portfolio returns, so
that investors do not experience the full volatility of the portfolio.
• Investors may participate in the proﬁts and losses of the insurer, including mor-
tality and expense risks.
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on retirement or death.
The guarantees mentioned in the ﬁnal point are often stated in terms of a prespec-
iﬁed minimum rate of return. Thus, investors participate in the returns of the insur-
ance companys portfolio, subject to a minimum ﬂoor on their return. Investors also
have the ability to surrender the policy before maturity, possibly subject to a penalty.1.2. Bonuses
In addition to the guaranteed rate of return, policyholders receive bonuses. These
bonuses are meant to reﬂect the overall performance of the ﬁrms portfolio, and to cor-
respond to ‘‘Policyholders Reasonable Expectations’’, based on such things as the
ﬁrms past performance, market practice, and any promotional material or communi-
cations to policyholders. Policyholders receive two types of bonus: regular and termi-
nal bonuses. Regular bonuses are declared each year. Once a regular bonus has been
declared, the bonus becomes guaranteed and the minimum rate of return now applies
to the original amount plus the declared bonus. The terminal bonus is awarded upon
maturity or surrender of the policy or upon occurrence of the insured event.
Bonuses typically reﬂect:
• The return achieved by the ﬁrms portfolio.
• General level of performance of the market.
• Policyholders expectations of bonus levels.
• A target level of terminal bonus (often expressed as a percentage of total policy-
holder beneﬁts).1.3. Existing literature
There is now a substantial and growing literature on the pricing of insurance
products with guarantees. The ﬁrst papers date back to the 1970s, including Brennan
and Schwartz (1976) and Boyle and Schwartz (1977), which analyzed unit-linked
maturity guarantees. More recently, a complete analysis of the policies has been
given by Grosen and Jørgensen (2000), who decompose the liability into a risk-free
bond (the minimum guarantee), a bonus option and a surrender option. Since the
ability of the insurance ﬁrm to meet any prespeciﬁed guarantee is greatly dependent
on interest rates, pricing the policies in the context of an appropriate stochastic inter-
est rate model is particularly important. Miltersen and Persson (1999) address the
pricing of insurance products with minimum guarantees in the interest rate frame-
work of Heath et al. (1992). It is important to note that the literature on pricing
the policies assumes that the companys asset portfolio is given exogenously, and
does not address the problem of structuring this portfolio optimally.
Research on with-proﬁts policies has mainly focussed on methods for reserving
and valuing the policies. Chadburn (1997) analyzes the impact of diﬀerent reserving
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pare a traditional reserving method with one based on an option pricing approach.
Comparatively little research has been undertaken on the issue of the optimal
structure of the insurance companys asset portfolio when guarantees are oﬀered.
In recent work, Iwaki and Yumae (2002) consider the problem of optimally structur-
ing the portfolio of a ﬁrm oﬀering a one-oﬀ maturity guarantee in a continuous time
economy. Jensen and Sørensen (2002) ask whether products with minimum guaran-
tees really serve investors interests, with interesting conclusions. The study of the
asset and liability management of ‘‘plain-vanilla’’ minimum guarantee products such
as those oﬀered in the Italian industry has been undertaken by Consiglio et al.
(2001). Among the results in their paper, they demonstrated that the ﬁrm could sub-
stantially increase shareholder value by considering the integrated asset and liability
management problem of structuring the ﬁrms portfolio optimally. In particular, it
was shown that ﬁrms could increase their proﬁts and oﬀer higher guarantees by
investing a higher proportion of their assets in an (optimally structured) equity
portfolio. Consiglio et al. (2003a,b) show that for these products, the portfolio opti-
mization problem can be solved very eﬃciently using algorithms for generalized geo-
metric programming. Booth et al. (1997) study the utility maximization of asset
allocations for insurers oﬀering non-proﬁt policies in the UK, without guarantees.
Consiglio, Saunders and Zenios (2002) present a comparison of the Italian and
UK minimum guarantee policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the scenario
optimization model for management of an insurance company oﬀering accumulating
with-proﬁts policies. Section 3 presents results based on employing the model with
scenarios generated using the Wilkie (1995) stochastic asset model. Section 4 presents
results on the sensitivity of the model to diﬀerent parameters and insurance policy fea-
tures. Section 5 summarizes the paper and presents conclusions.2. The scenario optimization model
In this section, we present the model for asset and liability management for insur-
ance products with guarantees. The model is a non-linear mathematical program,
which models stochastic variables using discrete scenarios. All portfolio decisions
are made at time t = 0 in anticipation of an uncertain future. At the end of the plan-
ning horizon, the impact of these portfolio decisions is evaluated and risk aversion is
introduced through a utility function. Portfolio decisions optimize expected utility
over the speciﬁed horizon.2.1. Features of the model
We let X denote the index set of scenarios l = 1,2, . . .,N, indicating realizations of
random variables, U the universe of available asset classes, and t = 1,2, . . .,T, dis-
crete points in time from today (t = 0) until the maturity date T.
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1. The liability account L, which grows according to the guaranteed rate and is aug-
mented by any declared bonuses. Llt is the liability value at time t in scenario l.
2. The asset account A, which grows according to the portfolio returns, net of any
payments due to death or policy surrender. We denote by Alt the asset value at
time t in scenario l.
3. The ‘‘reduced’’ asset account RA, which is used for the purpose of calculating reg-
ular bonuses. The value of the policyholders reduced asset share at time t in sce-
nario l is denoted by RAlt .
4. The equity account E, which tracks the present value of all funds invested by
shareholders. The total equity at time t in scenario l is denoted by Elt .
The multi-period dynamics of these accounts are conditioned on discrete scenar-
ios of realized asset returns and the composition of the asset portfolio.
In this paper, we consider a proprietary company operating a fund on a 90/10
basis (i.e. 90% of the beneﬁts go to the policyholders and 10% go to the sharehold-
ers). We assume that the company has a unique cohort of single-premium endow-
ment policies (i.e. there is only one generation of policyholders, paying a single
upfront premium) and attempt to determine the investment strategy that maximizes
shareholders utility.
2.2. Model parameters
The parameters of the model are as follows:
• rlit, rate of return of asset i during the period t  1 to t in scenario l.
• rlft, risk-free rate during the period t  1 to t in scenario l.
• g, minimum guaranteed rate of return.
• q, regulatory equity to debt ratio.
• Blt , benchmark rate, usually taken to be the yield on consols.
• Klt , rate of abandon of the policy due to lapse or death at period t in scenario l.
• c, policyholders rate of participation in the proﬁts of the ﬁrm (usually taken to be
90%).
• b, target terminal bonus rate.2.3. Decision variables
The decision variables of the model are deﬁned as follows:
• xi, fraction of initial capital invested in the ith asset.
• Alt , value of the assets at time t under scenario l.
• Llt , value of the guaranteed liability at time t under scenario l.
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• RAlt , value of the ‘‘reduced asset share’’ (used in calculating regular bonuses in
some approaches) at time t under scenario l.
• ylAt, expenses due to lapse or death at time t in scenario l.
• zlt , amount of equity provided by shareholders at time t in scenario l.
• RBlt , declared rate of regular bonus at time t in scenario l.
• DRBlt , change in regular bonus between time t  1 and time t.
• TBl, policyholders terminal bonus under scenario l.
• RlPt, portfolio rate of return during the period t  1 to t in scenario l, with positive
and negative parts Rþlt and R
l
t .
• yþlt , ylt , positive and negative parts of the policyholders shortfall under g at time t
in scenario l.
2.4. Variable dynamics and constraints
We invest the premium collected (L0) and the equity required by the regulators
(E0) in the asset portfolio. This initial amount A0 is allocated to assets in proportion
xi such that
P
i2Uxi ¼ 1, and the dynamics of the portfolio return are given by
RlPt ¼
X
i2U
xirlit; for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; and for all l 2 X. ð1Þ
We observe that the above equation assumes that the portfolio is rebalanced to the
initial asset mix xi, i 2 U at the end of each year (a so-called ‘‘ﬁxed-mix’’ strategy).
The strategy therefore entails some transactions costs, which could be introduced
into the optimization model without diﬃculty. Their eﬀects tend to be secondary,
and we ignore them in this paper. Shortselling is disallowed, and hence the invest-
ment variables are constrained to be non-negative.
The liability account grows at the guaranteed rate, plus any additional rate due to
the declared regular bonus. Therefore the dynamics of the liability are given by
Llt ¼ ð1 KltÞLlt1ð1þ gÞð1þmax½RBlt ; 0Þ. ð2Þ
We shall examine diﬀerent methods for determining the regular bonus (and therefore
diﬀerent equations for RBlt ) in Section 2.5.
Shortfalls are funded through the infusion of additional equity by shareholders.
The dynamics of the equity therefore become
Elt ¼ Elt1ð1þ rlftÞ þ zlt ; ð3Þ
where zlt is the amount of equity infused to fund shortfall at time t under scenario l.
We shall investigate diﬀerent methods of funding shortfall (and therefore diﬀerent
equations for Elt ) in Section 2.6.
Any equity provided by the shareholders is immediately invested in the asset port-
folio. This leads to the following equation for the dynamics of the assets.
Alt ¼ Alt1ð1þ RlPtÞ þ zlt  ylAt. ð4Þ
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anteed amount:
ylAt ¼ KltLlt1ð1þ gÞð1þ RBlt1Þ. ð5Þ
For the results reported in this paper, we have chosen to ignore lapse, and set K  0,
in order to focus on other policy features.
2.5. Bonus policy
In this section, we describe two diﬀerent alternatives for the structure of a bonus
policy, reﬂecting two views on bonuses that have been put forth in the UK. The ﬁrst
is derived from work done by an Institute of Actuaries Working Party, as presented
by Chadburn (1997). The second is a more traditional actuarial approach, based on
Ross (1989), which assumes that assets and liabilities grow at ﬁxed rates and aims for
a target level of terminal bonus.
2.5.1. The working party approach
This bonus policy is based on Chadburn (1997), which is in turn based on work
done by an Institute of Actuaries Working Party. The bonus policy has been some-
what simpliﬁed in order to bring out its most salient features. Chadburn states (with
our notation):The main features of the assumed bonus philosophy are to declare a regular
bonus RBlt . . . which, together with any guaranteed rate of fund increase,
broadly reﬂects the yield on consols, subject to policyholders funds remaining
lower than the value of a reduced policy asset share (RAlt ). RA
l
t accumulates at
approximately 75% of the total rate of return on assets . . . Should Llt exceed
RAlt , pressure to cut the bonus rate will be generated in the model. Hence the
diﬀerence between RAlt and the full policy asset share (A
l
t ) eﬀectively represents
a minimum value for the terminal bonus payable under the contract.There is also some smoothing of the reversionary bonus rates over time. This
smoothing (representing policyholders reasonable expectations that bonuses will
not ﬂuctuate wildly from year to year) is reﬂected in the autoregressive nature of
the bonus equation:
RBlt ¼
1
2
RBlt1 þ DRBlt . ð6Þ
The change in the regular bonus DRBlt reﬂects the yield on consols, and the fact that
the liabilities should not exceed the policyholders reduced asset share:
DRBlt ¼ pmax
Blt  g
1þ g ; 0
 
 qmax L
l
t1  RAlt1
RAlt1
; 0
 !
; ð7Þ
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benchmark and the reduction for solvency. We usually take p ¼ 1
2
and q ¼ 1
4
, as in
Chadburn (1997). The reduced asset share is given by
RAlt ¼ RAlt1 1þ
3
4
RþlPt 
4
3
RlPt
 
; ð8Þ
where RþlPt and R
l
Pt are the positive and negative parts of the portfolio return:
RlPt ¼ RþlPt  RlPt ð9Þ
with RþlPt , R
l
Pt P 0 and R
þl
Pt  RlPt ¼ 0 for all t = 1,2, . . .,T and all l 2 X.
The bonus policy reﬂects policyholders expectations to earn at least the yield of
consols on their investment. Assume that the consol rate is constant Blt  B and that
B > g and RAlt > L
l
t . Then assuming that RB
l
t1 ¼ ðB gÞ=ð1þ gÞ (for reasons that
will soon become apparent), the regular bonus becomes:
RBlt ¼
1
2
RBlt1 þ DRBlt ð10Þ
¼ 1
2
B g
1þ g
 
þ 1
2
B g
1þ g
 
þ 0 ð11Þ
¼ B g
1þ g ð12Þ
¼ RBlt1. ð13Þ
In this case the liability account (assuming no mortality) grows at the consol rate
B:
ð1þ gÞ 1þ B g
1þ g
  
¼ 1þ g þ B g ¼ 1þ B. ð14Þ2.5.2. Aiming for a target terminal bonus
In this approach, based partly on Ross (1989), the ﬁrm wishes the policyholders
terminal beneﬁt to be a ﬁxed portion of the total beneﬁt. For the purpose of calcu-
lating bonuses, it is assumed that assets will grow at a constant benchmark rate. This
results in the following terminal asset value:
AlT ¼ Altð1þ BltÞTt. ð15Þ
It is also assumed that the future level of regular bonus will remain constant so that
the guaranteed liabilities will also grow at a ﬁxed rate:
LlT ¼ ð1þ gÞTtð1þ RBltÞTt. ð16Þ
The terminal bonus received by policyholders is TBl ¼ cðAlT  LlT Þ. In order for this
to constitute b% of the total payout to policyholders, we must have
TBl
TBl þ LlT
¼ b. ð17Þ
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1þ RBlt ¼
1þ Blt
1þ g 
cð1 bÞ
bþ cð1 bÞ 
Alt
Llt
  1
Tt
. ð18Þ
Note the role of the ‘‘solvency ratio’’ A/L. When this ratio is higher, regular bonuses
increase, while when it is lower bonuses decrease. This should correspond to policy-
holders expectations of the ﬁrms practice when it faces insolvency. It is intuitively
obvious, and easy to show, that regular bonuses are a decreasing function of b.
2.6. Reserving methods
Recall the basic equations for the asset and equity accounts
Alt ¼Alt1ð1þ RlPtÞ þ zlt  ylAt; ð19Þ
Elt ¼Elt1ð1þ rlftÞ þ zlt . ð20Þ
In this section, we examine diﬀerent methods for specifying the term zlt .
2.6.1. Reserving for underperformance
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the one used in Consiglio et al. (2001), and reﬂects the
strict requirements applied in the Italian industry. With this method, funds are re-
quired from shareholders whenever the asset portfolio underperforms the guarantee
(even when there already exists a surplus of assets over liabilities). This policy results
in the following speciﬁcation:
zlt ¼ ylt Llt1; ð21Þ
cRlPt  g ¼ yþlt  ylt ; ð22Þ
where yþlt , y
l
t P 0 and y
þl
t  ylt ¼ 0 for all t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all l 2 X.
2.6.2. Reserving for solvency
In this method, which is similar to one considered for UK insurers in Booth et al.
(1997), one asks whether the assets would be suﬃcient to cover the current surrender
value of all the policies, plus some additional margin (to account for the possibility
of a future decline in assets). If not, then capital is infused so that this coverage does
exist. With a required regulatory margin of q (in this paper, we take q = 0.04), this
leads to the following equation:
zlt ¼ maxðð1þ qÞLlt  ðAlt1ð1þ RlPtÞ  ylAtÞ; 0Þ. ð23Þ
Thus, the prescription for determining whether any equity is added to the portfolio
at time t is as follows.
• Is the value of the assets after accounting for the return achieved, and any payouts
due to actuarial events, suﬃcient to meet the solvency ratio A/LP 1.04?
• If yes, then do not obtain equity from shareholders.
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mum solvency requirement A/LP 1.04.
2.7. Objective function
With both the bonus policies and reserving methods speciﬁed the complete
dynamics for all the accounts, and all trading constraints, are known. It remains
to specify the objective function to be maximized in structuring the ﬁrms optimal
portfolio. Since return on equity is scenario dependent, we maximize the expected
value of the utility of excess return. For ease of reference, in the exhibits this expected
value is converted into a certainty equivalent by applying the inverse of the utility
function. The objective function of the model is to compute the maximal Certainty
Equivalent Excess Return on Equity (CEexROE) given by
CEexROE ¼ U1 max
x
1
N
X
l2X
U
ð1 cÞðAlT  LlT Þ þ cElT
ElT
  !
. ð24Þ
Here U(Æ) is the shareholders utility function and ð1 cÞðAlT  LltÞ þ cElT is their
share of terminal wealth. If we had only ð1 cÞðAlT  LlT Þ, then we would not be
treating shareholders fairly. The returns on their invested equity would be handed
over to policyholders, even in the event of no underperformance below the guaran-
teed rate. This formulation arises from setting the shareholders ﬁnal wealth to
(1  c)((A  E)  L) + E. Policyholders then receive c((A  E)  L) + L.
2.8. The non-linear programming problem
The resulting non-linear program is
max
x
1
N
X
l2X
U
ð1 cÞðAlT  LlT Þ þ cElT
ElT
 
. ð25Þ
s.t.
X
i2U
xi ¼ 1; xi P 0; ð26Þ
Alt ¼ Alt1ð1þ RlPtÞ þ zlt  ylAt; ð27Þ
Llt ¼ ð1 KltÞLlt1ð1þ gÞð1þmax½RBlt ; 0Þ; ð28Þ
Elt ¼ Elt1ð1þ rlftÞ þ zlt ; ð29Þ
where the equations hold for t = 1,2, . . .,T and for all l 2 X, with A0 = L0 + E0,
E0 = qL0, RA0 = L0, and RB
l
t and z
l
t are determined using one of the prescriptions
above (full speciﬁcations of all the models solved in the paper are given in the appen-
dices). In all cases, the above optimization problem is a non-linearly constrained
non-linear programming problem. In general, the problem is not convex. It is there-
fore possible for the optimizer to halt at a local, rather than a global maximum. The
results for this paper were checked by starting the optimization procedure with dif-
ferent initial points. The model solution is insensitive to the choice of starting point.
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utility function, reserving for underperformance, bonuses declared using the working
party approach, and parameter values q = 0.04, p ¼ 1
2
, q ¼ 1
4
, K  0, c = 0.9.3. Model testing and validation
In this section, we discuss the performance of the base model. These results will
serve as a benchmark for the analysis of diﬀerent policy features and parameter sen-
sitivities carried out in the following sections.
Scenarios are generated using the Wilkie (1995) asset model. This results in ﬁve
asset classes: Cash (invested at the short-term risk-free rate), Consols (irredeemable
government bonds), Index-linked stock (inﬂation linked government bonds), Shares,
and Property. (The classes are ordered in terms of increasing expected return.) The
Wilkie model has been the subject of much scrutiny in the actuarial literature. Crit-
icisms include the fact that it ﬁts stationary models to certain economic time series
which may be non-stationary. This can have a dramatic eﬀect on long-term invest-
ment returns. For a very thorough presentation of the model see Wilkie (1995). A
brief description of the model and its equations is available online.1 For a critical
evalution, see Huber (1997).
Five hundred random scenarios were produced using the parameters recom-
mended in Wilkie (1995) and starting with ‘‘neutral’’ conditions (essentially, starting
the processes at their long-run means, see Wilkie, 1995). The model uses a yearly fre-
quency between time points t, and we consider a time horizon of 10 years. For each
model run, we determine the net annualized CEexROE
ð
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
CEexROE
T
p
 1Þ. ð30Þ
The eﬀects of taxation (particularly diﬀerential taxation across asset classes), while
important, are ignored in the current study.
3.1. Cost of the guarantee
With our model it is possible to compute the ‘‘expected cost of the guarantee’’ (as
distinct from the arbitrage-free price). This is the expected present value of reserves
required to fund shortfalls due to portfolio performances below the guarantee. The
dynamic variable Elt models the time t value of the total required funds, future-
valued at the risk-free rate. However, this variable also includes the initial amount
of equity qL0 in addition to premiums required by the regulators. This is not a cost
and should be deducted from Elt . Thus, the cost of the guarantee is given as the ex-
pected present value of the ﬁnal equity ElT adjusted by the regulatory equity, that is,
OG ¼ 1N
X
l2X
ElTQT
t¼1ð1þ rlftÞ
 qL0
 !
. ð31Þ1 http://www.inqa.com/GlobalWilkieMainFormulae.htm.
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Fig. 1 shows the tradeoﬀ between shareholders net CEexROE and the level of the
guarantee that the ﬁrm is able to oﬀer. This is a delicate decision. The ﬁrm will be
able to attract more customers by oﬀering higher and higher levels of the guarantee.
However, this increase will come at a reduced per policy beneﬁt to shareholders. Our
model does not directly address the issue of ﬁnding the optimal level of guarantee to
oﬀer, but rather allows the user to examine various sensitivities with respect to policy
features when making this decision. We remark that the results may be sensitive to
the chosen simulation methodology. The results show a steady decrease in share-
holders expected utility with increasing levels of the guarantee.
Figs. 2 and 3 examine the cost (in the sense of (31)) that shareholders pay in order
to fund the guarantee. Fig. 2 shows the cost incurred by shareholders at each level ofBase Model: Minimum Guarantee vs. Net CEexROE
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Fig. 1. Base model: shareholders utility for diﬀerent levels of minimum guarantee.
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increasingly steep as unrealistically high levels of guarantee are oﬀered. Fig. 3 plots
CEexROE vs. Cost for the optimal portfolios at each level of minimum guaranteed
return. This curve is analogous to a mean–variance eﬃcient frontier in that it dis-
plays the tradeoﬀ between shareholder beneﬁt (Net CEexROE) and risk (expected
cost to fund the guarantee).
Fig. 4 examines the optimal asset allocation strategy (weights for cash and consols
are nearly zero; recall that we optimize over ﬁxed-mix strategies) for diﬀerent levels
of the minimum guarantee. Observe that it is generally optimal to pursue aggressive
portfolios (high proportions in property – a high risk and high return asset class).
For reasonable levels of the minimum guarantee, this aggressive portion of the port-
folio is supplemented by a signiﬁcant position in index-linked stock (it is this invest-
ment that hedges the guaranteed liability, while the aggressive portfolio componentBase Model: Minimum Guarantee vs. Cost
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Fig. 2. Base model: cost of funding diﬀerent levels of guarantee.
Fig. 3. Base model: tradeoﬀ between CEexROE and cost of the guarantee.
658 A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667seeks to maximize returns). For high levels of the minimum guarantee, the company
is forced to invest all the funds in the highest returning asset classes. This is the only
way it can hope to meet the guarantee (of course, when property loses money, as this
high risk asset class often will, the liability must be covered with new funds from the
shareholders, producing a correspondingly high cost). This asset allocation is consis-
tent with other experiments involving optimal portfolio problems based on the Wil-
kie model (see the comments section in Wilkie, 1995).4. Comparison of policy features
We examine all the possible combinations of reserving strategies and bonus pol-
icies as described above. In the ﬁgures, these strategies are referenced as follows:
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Fig. 4. Base model: asset allocation for diﬀerent levels of the minimum guarantee.
A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667 659• Targ-Solv: Aiming for a target level of terminal bonus and reserving for solvency.
• Targ-Und: Aiming for a target level of terminal bonus and reserving for
underperformance.
• WP-Sol: Declaring regular bonuses using the working party approach and reserv-
ing for solvency.
• WP-Und: Declaring regular bonuses using the working party approach and
reserving for underperformance.
Fig. 5 presents the CEexROE for diﬀerent levels of the minimum guarantee for
each of these bonus/reserving strategies.
The ﬁrst observation is that regardless of bonus strategy, reserving for solvency
outperforms reserving for underperformance. This is to be expected, as reserving
Comparison of Policy Features
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Fig. 5. Base model: comparison of performance of policies with diﬀerent features for diﬀerent levels of the
guarantee.
660 A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667for underperformance places strict requirements on shareholders to provide funds
whenever the portfolio does worse than the guarantee rate. This substantially in-
creases the size of the investment, and does not produce a correspondingly large in-
crease in return. Thus the model accords with our intuition that the stricter reserving
method is worse for shareholders. The model also provides a way of quantifying the
damage to shareholders caused by more stringent regulations (such as those in the
Italian industry) requiring reserving for underperformance.
Bonus policies based on aiming at a target level of terminal bonus tend to outper-
form those which follow the working party strategy. This is because the target level
of terminal bonus calculations assume a rate of asset growth that is in general lower
than that realized. The lower regular bonus rate leads to greater freedom on the part
A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667 661of the insurer (as to how it can invest the surplus A  L), as well as lower (non-ter-
minal) liabilities, and therefore a smaller probability of needing to request further
funds from shareholders (thus hurting shareholder returns). If higher rates of asset
growth were assumed in the target calculation, results would be correspondingly
diﬀerent.
Fig. 6 shows the cost of providing diﬀerent levels of the guarantee for each of the
strategies. Not surprisingly, reserving for underperformance costs signiﬁcantly more
than reserving for solvency. This also stems from the reduced freedom insurance
companies have when required to use this reserving method. Once again, the work-
ing party method of declaring bonuses slightly underperforms the method where bo-
nuses are declared using a ﬁxed target terminal bonus rate, and this is due to the
unrealistic growth rates assumed in this bonus calculation (which are biased towards
the insurance company and away from policyholders).Comparison of Policy Features
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Fig. 6. Base model: comparison of cost of providing the guarantee for diﬀerent policy features.
662 A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667Fig. 7 plots the Cost vs. Net CEexROE frontier for each of the strategies dis-
cussed above. The results are generally consistent with those present above. In this
graph, more eﬃcient strategies lie above and to the right of less eﬃcient strategies.
Therefore, the results agree with the general ranking of policy features, from best
to worst, that can be arrived at from looking at any of the above graphs:
1. Bonuses using target level of terminal bonus and reserving for solvency.
2. Bonuses using the working party approach and reserving for solvency.
3. Bonuses using target level of terminal bonus and reserving for underperformance.
4. Bonuses using the working party approach and reserving for underperformance.Comparison of Policy Features
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Fig. 7. Base model: comparison of performance of policies with diﬀerent features for diﬀerent levels of the
guarantee.
A. Consiglio et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 645–667 663Some observations regarding practical implementations of the model are in order.
The ﬁrst is that since it is a non-convex problem, great care should be taken to ensure
that the local optima returned by a non-linear programming solver. The second is
our optimal portfolios contain signiﬁcant investments in property. The model for
property in Wilkie (1995) is based on a short time-series, and the author warns that
it should be used with caution. In practice, we recommend comparing the results pre-
sented herein with those generated with an upper bound (possibly zero) on the allow-
able level of investment in property. A large portion of the funds would then be
transferred from property to shares. We note that the basic qualitative features of
the results (shapes of curves, relative ranking of bonus and reserving policies, etc.)
remain unchanged when property investment is disallowed and a simple brute force
grid search is employed for the optimization.5. Conclusions
This paper has presented a model for analyzing the investment decisions made by
insurance ﬁrms that oﬀer policies with minimum guarantee provisions. The model
allows the insurance company to compare diﬀerent policy features in order to deter-
mine how best to structure its policies. Numerical results demonstrate how this can
be done in order to compare diﬀerent bonus policies and diﬀerent methods for
reserving against insolvency.Acknowledgements
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ICA1-CT-2000-70015.Appendix A. Complete model speciﬁcations
In the appendix, we present the full form of all the optimization models solved in
the paper. All variables indexed by l are over l 2 X; those over i are for i 2 U and
those indexed by t are for t = 0, . . .,T. For instance rlit is the return of asset i at time
t in scenario l. Constraints that are set apart after a space are those that vary between
the models.
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The parameters are c, L0, rlit, q, K
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The parameters are c, L0, rlit, q, K
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